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Abstract. Our understanding of what exactly needs protected against in order to safeguard a plausi-
ble construal of our ‘freedom of thought’ is changing. And this is because the recent influx of cogni-
tive offloading and outsourcing—and the fast-evolving technologies that enable this—generate rad-
ical new possibilities for freedom-of-thought violating thought manipulation. This paper does three
main things. First, I briefly overview how recent thinking in the philosophy of mind and cogni-
tive science recognises—contrary to traditional Cartesian ‘internalist’ assumptions—ways in which
our cognitive faculties, and even our beliefs, can be materially realised by as well as stored non-
biologically and extracranially. Second, and taking brain-computer interface technologies (BCIs)
and the associated possibility of ‘extended’ beliefs as a reference point, I propose and defend a suf-
ficient condition on freedom-of-thought violating (extended) thought manipulation. On the view
proposed, the right not to have one’s thoughts or opinionsmanipulated is violated if one is (i) caused
to acquire non-autonomous propositional attitudes (acquisition manipulation) or (ii) caused to have
otherwise autonomous propositional attitudes non-autonomously eradicated (eradication manipu-
lation). The implications of this view are then illustrated through four thought experiments, which
map on to four distinct ways—what I call Type 1-Type 4manipulation—inwhich, andwith reference
to the view defended, one’s freedom of thought is plausibly violated.
1. A central platitude in legal and political philosophy, and which lies at the heart
of many democratic constitutional systems, is that all individuals enjoy—in slogan
form—the freedom of thought. Even if your actions are constrained by laws, your ca-
pacity to exercise your own mind as you wish is not equally constrained.
Kant ([1797] 1991) famously committed himself to this idea by defining the scope
of juridical laws so as to exclude them from applying to themind, insisting that juridi-
cal laws apply only to ‘external actions.’1 Other philosophers, like Mill ([1859] 1998),
have defended the freedom of thought by pointing to the disutility of its absence: the
1For discussion, see Bublitz (2013, 241).
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2suppression of opinion thwarts a community’s capacity to discover and maintain the
truth.2
Outside of philosophy, a defence of the freedom of thought is enshrined explic-
itly in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which ensures that
‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.’ Elsewhere,
in U.S. Constitutional legal scholarship, it is lauded by Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendel Holmes as the principle that “most imperatively calls for attachment.”
But even if the existence of a freedom so described is not controversial, things get
thorny quickly when we zero in on what constitutes a plausible violation of it. This
is especially so when we distinguish what is involved in violating one’s freedom as
pertains to (i) expression of thought; versus (ii) the thought itself. We can easily conceive
of what it takes to violate (i) by looking to egregious examples of such violations—e.g.,
political persecution ofminority opinions as expressed through religious and political
demonstration and speech.
Question: But what would it be, exactly, to violate one’s freedom to simply form
and possess her own thoughts as opposed to express them, and to violate this freedom
non-trivially? (A trivial way to violate any kind of freedom in thinking, categorically,
would be to cause injury to the physical brain, injury to which is already legislated
against as a paradigmatic physical harm.) Is the freedom to (in short) think as one
wishes—at least on those matters on which it is possible when functioning normally
to control thought3—something that could be violated any other way? And if not,
then did we even need to make this freedom explicit in the first place?
2. It is tempting to think the answer to these questions is ‘no’4, given how pervasive
the Cartesian picture of the mind, as a kind of private ‘inner theatre’, remains in or-
dinary thought and talk, as well as, implicitly, in legal and political thinking.5 On the
Cartesian view, according to which a thinker alone has privileged and exclusive access
2See, e.g., On Liberty, ([1859] 1998, Ch. 2).
3Even when paradigmatically free, our thinking is not entirely in our control—as philosophers have
recognised in denying doxastic voluntarism, the view that (in short) we can believe what we desire to be-
lieve, and to do so directly without any intermediate steps in thinking. A simple kind of counterexample
to doxastic voluntarism concerns perception. If there is a red table in front of you, and you desire to see a
blue table and to immediately form the belief <There is a blue table>, you will not be able to do it. The de-
nial of doxastic voluntarism is compatible with the thought that you have a kind of indirect control over
(some) beliefs about what is true, which can be brought about by intentionally taking steps to acquire
certain kinds of evidence. For some notable discussions of doxastic voluntarism and the philosophical
issues surrounding it, see, e.g., Audi (2001), Clarke (1986), and Steup (2000).
4Perhaps one exception though is found in debates surrounding indoctrination in the philosophy of
education. It’s beyond the scope of what I can do to cover this here, but some relevant stances are found
in Hand (2002; 2004), Gardner (2004), Hansson (2018), and Siegel (2004).
5For some discussion on this point, see Carter and Palermos (2016). See also Blitz (2010).
3to the content of her own thoughts, thought itself is in principle unregulatable (apart
from regulating against physical injury to the brain) and so there would seem to be no
point to legislating it in a way that goes beyond regulating physical harm. We could
at most, on the Cartesian view, attempt to regulate a thinker’s thoughts indirectly by
regulating (e.g., punishing) the behaviour we take to be evidence of thought.6 However,
and in line with Kant’s thinking, these regulations themselves would be de facto reg-
ulations of (e.g., verbal and physical) behaviour, and not regulations of anything like
the shape and character of thought as such.
But—as contemporary thinking in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science
suggest—Descartes was wrong in (at least) two important ways about the ‘inner’ na-
ture of the mind. First—as Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980), and Burge (1986) showed
in the 1970s and 80s, it is mistaken to think that the content of our thoughts is either (i)
transparent to us7 or (ii) determined solely by the innerworkings of themind. Content
internalism has since been rejected almost universally for content externalism, which
holds that the content of our thoughts—viz., what our thoughts are about—is at least
partly determined by facts about our physical and socio-linguistic environments that
might be inaccessible to us on reflection.8 For example, on this view, when you think
about the wet, blue stuff that you see in oceans, whether you are thinking about wa-
ter (which is type identical with H2O) or about something else (as Putnam imagined:
‘XYX’—viz., something which is very similar to water but which is not identical to
H2O), depends on what the physical environment you are interacting with is actually
like, and this is something you might not have reflective access to while entertaining
the image of the blue, wet stuff.9
More importantly for our purposes, though, a second kind of Cartesian doctrine
about the mind’s inner nature—cognitive internalism—has also fallen into disrepute,
and has increasingly done so over the past 10 years.10 Whereas content internalism
concerned the content of thoughts—viz.., what your thought counts as being a thought
about—cognitive internalism is a thesis about the kinds of things thatmaterially realise
cognition, viz., about the kinds of physical processes on which cognition supervenes.
6Alternatively, one might indirectly regulate thought by depriving another of information (or tools
to generate information). For example, onemight indirectly regulate amathematician’s ability to discover
a certain result—and thus, to believe that result is true—by depriving her of a pencil and paper. Thanks
to John Tillson for noting this other indirect form of thought regulation.
7See also Schwitzgebel (2008).
8See Carter et al. (2014).
9The denial of content externalism is closely related to a range of puzzles in the contemporary liter-
ature on self-knowledge. For discussion, see, e.g., Gertler (2000, 2010), Parent (2017), McKinsey (1991),
and Pritchard (2002).
10See, e.g., Clark (2008),Menary (2007), Palermos (2011, 2014b),Wilson (2000, 2004). For criticism,
see, e.g., Adams and Aizawa (2008).
4Prior to Clark and Chalmers’ landmark paper ‘The Extended Mind’ (1998), even
most content externalists in the philosophy of mind were still cognitive internalists.
They held that although one’s physical and socio-linguistic11 environment can par-
tially determine the content of one’s thoughts, only intracranial processes—i.e., bi-
ological processes that play out in brain—are the sorts of things that can materially
‘bring about’ cognitive processes like memory, reasoning, perception and the like.
But even this more basic kind of internalism about the mind is falling to the way-
side. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), our assessments of
what kinds of things can feature in ‘cognitive’ process should be guided by common-
sense functionalist thinking, rather than by considerations to do with physical make-
up or special location. For example, according to the HEC proponent, if you are us-
ing a well-integrated smartphone to do what biomemory does—viz., to play the role
biomemory normally plays in storing and retrieving information—then to the extent
you have dispositional beliefs (i.e., which become occurrent beliefs when retrieved
and brought to conscious awareness) stored in biomemory, you also have ‘extended’
dispositional beliefs stored in your phone’s memory, or in the cloud.12 This might
seem radical, but to say otherwise, on this line of thought, commits one to an unprin-
cipled kind of ‘bioprejudice’13 that gives arbitrary weight to material constitution and
special location when demarcating the bounds of the cognitive.
3. Against this background, it should be obvious that the question of what it would
be to violate one’s freedom of thought—and not just her expression of thought in
speech and action—can hardly be set aside as moot or purely theoretical. And this
is because the latest cognitive science allows beliefs, memories, perceptions14, and
the like, to be materially realised by processes that include parts of the world which
themselves are not in principle ‘hidden away’ in some Cartesian theatre, but subject
publicly to various kinds of manipulation by other parties.15
And the picture is complicated further when we include recent advancements in,
and the potential future of, brain-computer interface (BCI) technologies.16 To make
11See, e.g., Burge’s (1986) arthritis/tharthritis example.
12For discussion, see, e.g., Clark (2010, 2008), Carter and Kallestrup (2016, 2017), Carter and
Pritchard (2020), Menary (2010), Pritchard (2010, 2018), and Palermos (2014a).
13The use of this term is due to Chalmers (2008).
14While HEC is often explained in terms of extended memory processes, the thesis also applies to
perception, and this can be illustrated with reference to tactile visual substitution systems (TVSS). See,
e.g., Bach-y-Rita (1983), Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003), and Palermos (2016).
15For a discussion of such violations and their potential legal ramifications, see Carter and Palermos
(2016).
16For some representative recent developments in BCI technologies for use in cognitive enhance-
ment, see, e.g., Ghafoor et al. (2019), Wang et al. (2019), and Pisarchik, Maksimenko, and Hramov
(2019).
5concrete the kinds of possibilities generated by BCIs, consider that in October 2019,
a French dentist who had fallen 15 feet walked for the first time in two years using his
mind to control an exoskeleton suit. Themanwho goes by the first name ‘Thibault’ has
implants on his brain that read its activity and send this to a nearby computer, which
in turn uses this information to send instructions to the exoskeleton. The result is
that Thibault can, simply by thinking, control the limbs of the exoskeleton in three-
dimensional space.17
The reasoning of ElonMusk, who has launched BCI start-upNeuralink (and other
BCI startups such as BrainCo, Emotiv, Kernel,Mindmaze, NeuroSky, NeuroPro, Neurable,
and Pandromics) if that we can use neural implants to communicate with comput-
ers in the therapeutic case—viz., where the aim is to restore an individual to normal,
healthy levels of human functioning in order to correct disease and pathology18—why
not use it to take already healthy individuals beyond normal levels of functioning, es-
pecially when it comes to cognitive functioning, wheremore sophisticated BCIs can in
principle allow us to not only send but also receive information immediately through
thought commands.19
To make this idea a bit more concrete, think about what you do when you say
“Hey Google/Siri what’s the weather today?” Moments later, Google/Siri tells you the
answer. Now just imagine streamlining this process. You think, rather than verbalise
“What’s the weather?” And soon after, perhaps immediately, your brain receives the
information20 from the computer you’ve just communicated with via a thought com-
mand.
I am going to assume from here on in that these kinds of BCI enhancement tech-
nologies are worth taking seriously, even if they have not yet arrived fully functional.
What is important for philosophical and legal thinking about the freedom of thought
is whether we have a clear way to think about how to protect freedom of thought in
connection with them when (if) they arrive.
4. Current international law frameworks recognise three key elements to one’s free-
dom of thought which can be threatened in different ways by new technologies.21
These are, as Susan Alegre (2017, 225) summarises: (i) the right not to reveal one’s
17See Carter (2020b Ch. 1) for a recent discussion of this case.
18For discussion on the distinction between cognitive enhancement and mere therapeutic cognitive
improvements, see, e.g., Bostrom and Sandberg (2009) and Carter and Pritchard (2019).
19See Musk (2019).
20Different possible BCIs might realise this operation differently, e.g., by prompting content repre-
sentation and regulating attention via the implant; the assumption should be that these ways will trend in
the direction of being increasingly seamless and non-obtrusive as BCI technologies continue to improve
in the more distant future.
21For discussion, see Alegre (2017).
6thoughts or opinions; (ii) the right not to have one’s thoughts or opinions manipu-
lated; (iii) the right not to be penalised for one’s thoughts.
The advent of HEC bears directly on (i) and by extension (iii). HEC implies that,
to the extent that your mind is partly located (in certain circumstances) in external
memory storage, the right you have not to reveal your thoughts is a right that extends
also to certain protections from inspection of such external storage.22
The rise of BCI technologies, by contrast, poses special challenges for (ii), and
better understanding these challenges helps to equip us for future thinking about the
freedom of thought. Or so I want to argue. Here is the plan for what follows. In §5
I propose by using illustrative BCI-style cases, a sufficient condition for freedom-of-
thought violating ‘extended’ thought manipulation, viz., thought manipulation that
involves some kind of distortion of a thinker’s non-biological mental faculties.23 Once
this condition is set out and defended, I will, in the remaining sections, taxonomize
four distinct varieties of freedom-of-thought-violating extended thought manipula-
tion which have interestingly different structures, but which all satisfy the proposed
sufficient condition.
5. Let’s distinguish two kinds of cases where a thinkermight be fittedwith a BCI: pre-
arranged cases and non-pre-arranged cases, e.g., where in the latter kind of case, one’s
being fitted with a BCI is not in accordance with one’s past autonomous decisions.24
For example: a person is unwillingly ‘experimented on’.
Non-pre-arranged BCI cases constitute trivial violations of one’s freedom against
thought manipulation, however such freedom may be plausibly construed; but such
cases are covered under the wider class of protections against physical harm and in-
jury. What I want to suggest in what follows is that even pre-arranged BCI implemen-
tation cases can very easily serve as ones where a thinker’s freedom against thought
manipulation is violated. Appreciating this has potential practical import in a very
possible future in which consenting to BCI fitting is a typical and common form of
cognitive enhancement.25
22For an interesting recent take on this idea, see Riley v. California (2014), and in particular, John
Roberts’ majority opinion on the case, in which he draws comparisons between cell phones and human
biological anatomy. http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-132_8l9c.pdf For an overview in the
context of the extended cognition debate, see Carter and Palermos (2016).
23Note that manipulation is distinct from coersion. For discussion on this difference, see, e.g., Baron
(2003), cf., Ghafoor et al. (2019).
24I am setting aside for the purposes of discussion here issues to do with thought manipulation via
genetic enhancement, or by testing and selecting for certain embryos; these cases, while interesting and
important, are difficult to address without a foray into questions of personal identity that go beyondwhat
I can cover here.
25For an influential defence of the idea that we can expect to increasingly incorporate BCIs, see Clark
(2003).
7More specifically, what I want to propose and then sharpen is the following suffi-
cient condition on freedom-of-thought violating thought manipulation:
Thought Manipulation (Sufficiency) (TMS):The right not to have one’s
thoughts or opinionsmanipulated is violated if one is (i) caused to acquire
non-autonomous propositional attitudes (acquisition manipulation) or
(ii) caused to have otherwise autonomous propositional attitudes non-
autonomously eradicated (eradication manipulation).
Regarding the acquisition manipulation component of (TMS): a term that needs
clarified is that of a non-autonomous propositional attitude.26 Examples of propo-
sitional attitudes are beliefs and desires, e.g., your belief that Paris is the capital of
France, your desire that you not eat liver for dinner this evening. Following influ-
ential work on autonomous attitudes by Al Mele (2001), I am going to assume that,
sufficient for a propositional attitude’s not being autonomous, and thus, not being
such that it is properly attributable27 to the agent, is the conjunction of two condi-
tions: (i) a bypass condition—viz., a condition pertaining to whether the attitude in
question was acquired in a way that ‘bypassed’ the subject’s relevant (e.g., cognitive
and conative) faculties28; and (ii) an unsheddability condition—viz., a condition per-
taining to whether the subject is able to (easily enough) give up, or at least attenuate
the strength of, the relevant attitude.29 Regarding the eradication manipulation com-
ponent of (TMS). To unpack this further, say that an otherwise autonomous proposi-
tional attitude is caused to be non-autonomously eradicated if it is caused to be either
(a) shed (e.g., to go out of existence, or to decrease in severity) or (b) blocked from
manifesting in ways that relevantly bypass a thinker’s cognitive and conative faculties.
The core idea of TMS is, in sum, that your freedom of thought is violated if you’re
caused to either acquire an unsheddable attitude that your own faculties played no
26Note that, on the proposed account—which states just a sufficiency condition and not a necessary
condition—it’s entirely possible that the right not to have one’s thoughts or opinions manipulated could
be violated non-propositionally as well, e.g., via the compromise of faculties or dispositions in such a
way as to leave all representational content as is. For the purpose of this paper, I’m keeping my focus on
propositional manipulation; an interesting and relevant question for further work concerns thematter of
freedom-of-thought manipulation via one’s dispositions directly. Thanks to John Tillson for discussion
on this point.
27I am using attributability here in the sense ofWatson (1996) as denoting ‘character revealing’. Your
striking someone as a result of being pushed into that person is, for example, is not properly attributable
to you, as it in no way reveals your character—viz., your stable dispositions of mind.
28See Carter (2020b Ch. 2) for a detailed discussion of different ways to interpret this condition.
29For alternative ways of thinking about attitudinal autonomy, see, e.g., Dworkin (1981) and Frank-
furt (1988). For developments of a Mele-style approach to attitudinal autonomy—an approach which
denies that attitudinal autonomy is entirely a matter of one’s present psychological structure and can also
include such things as the attitude’s history—see, e.g., Weimer (2009) and Carter (2020b, Ch. 2, 2020a).
8role in acquiring or are caused to shed (or block) an attitude that your own faculties
played no role in your shedding.
A simple and egregious case of acquisition manipulation is having beliefs or de-
sires ‘implanted’ in a clandestine fashion. A simple and egregious case of eradication
manipulation is having beliefs or desires ‘wiped’ in a clandestine fashion. But these
are just ‘limit’ cases; what’s more interesting (as we’ll see in §6) are the less egregious
but nonetheless morally and epistemically significant violations.
A final point of clarification: (TMS), it should be emphasised, does not imply that
if a subject had an implanted belief or desire thatwas sheddable, then it would thereby
not constitute a violation of her freedom against acquisition manipulation. This is be-
cause (TMS)—both its acquisition and eradication clauses—offers sufficiency condi-
tions but not necessity conditions on freedom-of-thought violating thought manipu-
lation. However, even as a (disjunctive) sufficiency condition for attitudinal acquisi-
tion and eradication manipulation, TMS is of philosophical interest. As we’ll see in
the next section—using some BCI-based thought experiments—any plausible right
we have against thought manipulation can be violated (with reference to the clauses
in TMS) in crucially different kinds of ways, which map on to (at least) four interest-
ingly different ‘varieties’ of freedom-of-thought violating thought manipulation.
6. Let’s now consider the following cases:
Case 1: Otto, due to gradually failing biomemory, asks to be fitted with
a sophisticated ‘Neuralink Memory-Pro’ brain computer interface that
will help ‘pick up the slack’ where his memory is failing, when it comes
to scheduling and organising his life.30 The BCI is designed so that when
Otto learns something he wants to include in his calendar, the informa-
tion goes, via a thought command, rather than to his biomemory, straight
to the BCI’s cloud storage (e.g., much like a Google Calendar). When he
attempts to recall old information from the Memory-Pro, he receives the
information that is stored. For Otto, the Neuralink Memory-Pro plays
the role that biomemory, pen-and-paper, as well as manually operated
computers used to play for structuring his day. Unbeknownst toOtto, the
Memory Pro’s software update has now automatically ‘auto-integrated’
national and bank holiday dates into Otto’s cloud storage.
Assessment: Otto’s initial and consensual fitting of the Neuralink Memory-Pro
violated no thought-based right of his. However, the software update did. The rea-
son, with reference to TMS, is that the update causes him to acquire non-autonomous
30This case is a twist on Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) case of ‘Otto’, which they use to motivate the
extended mind.
9(extended) propositional attitudes (e.g., national and bank holiday dates). For clas-
sification purposes, let’s call Case 1 a Type 1 case for the following reason: freedom
against thought manipulation is violated due to the acquisition of a non-autonomous
belief in such a way that no faculty (cognitive or conative) was exercised whatsoever in
the acquisition of the (extended) belief; in other words, his faculties have been fully
bypassed in the course of propositional attitude acquisition.31 As we’ll see in Case 2,
freedom against thought manipulation can be violated (with reference to the acquisi-
tion manipulation clause in TMS) even when faculties are only partially bypassed.
Case 2: Everything is the same as with Case 1, except for some of the de-
tails about the nature of the Neuralink Memory-Pro’s update and Otto’s
knowledge about it. First, the update is much more extensive, in that it
inserts (along with bank holidays) various other kinds of information,
which will continuously be added, including on the basis of algorithmic
suggestions synced from his other devices (e.g. “Stores open late in your
area tonight for Black Friday shopping” … “This Sunday, new Netflix
WWI documentary available”, etc.). Due to high demand for the prod-
uct, Otto is given an impossibly brief period of time to decide whether
to opt-in or out-out of the update, not long enough for him to under-
stand what kinds of things it will include (and how they’re included), and
he’s provided no further information from the company. On good faith,
Otto opts in, and is soonafter baffled by what seem to be his own beliefs
(and by extension, plans), and he begins losing his grip on what he had
intentionally stored and what was prompted by the Memory-Pro’s algo-
rithms.32
Assessment: Unlike Case 1, it’s not the case that Otto’s acquisition of the algorith-
mically generated information inserted in his Memory-Pro via the update completely
31This includes no such exercise of a cognitive faculty in the past, as would be the case, for example,
if one prearranged to have bank dates auto-inserted via the update at a future date.
32It’s worth registering an important difference between the kind of situation described in Case 2
(a genuine acquisition manipulation case) with a superficially similar situation depicted in the science
fiction show Almost Human. In that show—set in a cyborg future—it is common for individuals to see
personalised hologram advertising, which targets the individual user. For example, while walking to the
store, you might see a hologram on the side of a building which appears there (keyed to your GPS) to
target you specifically, on the basis of sophisticated algorithms. In such a case, you would be—like Otto
in Case 2—‘bombarded’ with content it would be very easy to ‘uptake’, and further, in both cases, you are
cognitively influenced. But theAlmostHuman situation is not a genuine case of acquisitionmanipulation
(of either Type 1 or Type 2) because, in this case, your autonomy is being respected; you are nudged,
but not caused to uptake or endorse anything that features in the aggressive hologram-style advertising.
However, the situation is different in Case 2 (as well as in Case 1) where acquisition manipulation is
present.
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bypassed his faculties. (He was after all informed that there would be some updates;
he understood this much and consented to the update in so far as he understood it,
which was limited given his unusually restricted opportunities). Nonetheless, this is a
case where, with reference to TMS, the update causes him to acquire non-autonomous
(extended) propositional attitudes and in doing so violates his freedom against acqui-
sition manipulation. For classification purposes, let’s call this a Type 2 case for the
following reason: freedom against thought manipulation is violated due to the ac-
quisition of non-autonomous (extended) beliefs (like Case 1), where these extended
beliefs are non-autonomous not because (as in Case 1) their acquisition bypasses fac-
ulties altogether, but because it bypasses suitable opportunities to exercise those facul-
ties.33
In sum: whereas Type 1 acquisition manipulation involves acquiring attitudes in
ways that completely bypass the thinker’s faculties, Type 2 acquisition manipulation
involves acquiring attitudes in ways that bypass suitable opportunities to exercise those
faculties, even if not bypassing the faculties wholesale.
Case 3: Everything is the same as with Case 1, with a few important ex-
ceptions. The Neuralink Memory-Pro’s creators, inspired by the efficacy
in ‘strategic forgetting’34 demonstrated by deep neural networks and re-
inforcement learning techniques at Google DeepMind, have introduced
an algorithm in the latest update that deletes information stored in the
Memory-Pro deemed to be ‘clogging’ up the system. This includes, for
example, information about plans that have been canceled or superseded
by other plans. It also includes information stored in the Memory-Pro
that is both flagged by the algorithm as ‘unimportant details’ (e.g., the
weather back on 5 May 2024) and which has gone long enough without
being retrieved. The update’s functions, including how the algorithm tar-
gets information for deletion, are not made suitably explicit to users.
Assessment: With reference to (TMS), Case 3 is a case of eradication manipula-
tion rather than acquisition manipulation. Recall that, on (TMS), an otherwise au-
tonomous propositional attitude is caused to be non-autonomously eradicated if it is
33Plausibly, after all, your faculties are ‘bypassed’ in the acquisition of an attitude in a way that is
relevant to whether the attitude is autonomous if you acquire it without suitable opportunity to exercise
those faculties. (By way of comparison: An otherwise non-autonomous attitude whose acquisition by-
passes one’s faculties wouldn’t be ‘converted’ into an autonomous attitude simply were it the cases that
one was able to exercise one’s faculties in unsuitable circumstances in coming to acquire the attitude.)
For a detailed discussion of this issue, framed in terms of competences rather than faculties, see Carter
(2020b Ch. 2).
34See, e.g., Beierle and Timm (2019) and Silver et al. (2017).
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caused to be shed (e.g., to go out of existence, or to decrease in intensity) in ways that
relevantly bypass your cognitive and conative faculties. In this case, Otto’s faculties
have been bypassed precisely because he lacks an explanation for how the algorithm is
targeting stored information. Call this kind of case—where the mechanisms of mem-
ory eradication (as opposed to acquisition) are opaque to one—a Type 3 case. The
difficulty of legislating Type 3 cases, it is worth noting, is already evidenced in recent
debates following the 2018 GDPR (Art. 22, 13-15, Recital 71) about a data subject’s
‘right to an explanation’, when purely algorithmic decisions are used tomake decisions
that affect someone’s interests.35
Case 4: After years of enjoying his Neuralink Memory-Pro BCI, Otto
wants ‘the next big thing’, which is Neuralink’s ‘i-Connect’ BCI device,
which promises to help a thinker better ‘organise one’s mind’. The de-
vice’s key trick is to use semantic tagging to sort information committed
via thought command to information storage into compartments. Al-
gorithms are then run on specific compartments in order to ‘connect’
information a thinker might not have connected themselves, which is
then ‘suggested’ to the user on the basis of retrieval cues. The i-Connect
promises, for example, to help usersmake better decisions on issues rang-
ing from whom to trust (e.g., by storing track-record information) to
which things to do to best relax. The suggestions made by the i-Connect,
however, interfere with a thinker’s own natural capacities for insight and
creativity. In particular, the i-Connect does this by (albeit, inadvertently)
blocking the efficacy of ‘incubation’ in insight problem solving tasks.36
Assessment: Let’s assume, ex hypothesi, that Otto is fully aware of what kind of in-
formation the i-Connect enables him to acquire and even how it does this, such that
the case is not, with reference to (TMS), a case of acquisition manipulation; in short,
in Case 4, the ‘bypass’ condition on acquisition manipulation is not met ex hypothesi.
That said, with reference to (TMS), Case 4 is a case of eradication manipulation. But
this is not due (as in Case 3) to the ‘shedding’ proviso on eradicationmanipulation but
due to the ‘blocking’ proviso. In Case 4, various insights Otto would have had have
been effectively, even if not by intentional design, ‘blocked’. Having insights blocked
needn’t violate a plausible freedom against thought manipulation (with reference to
TMS’s eradication manipulation component) if such blocking itself did not relevantly
35For discussion, see Goodman and Flaxman (2017) and Selbst and Powles (2017). For criticism
that the GDPR can reasonably be interpreted as insuring a ‘right to an explanation’ on the part of data
subjects when purely algorithmic decisions are made that affect their interests, see Wachter, Mittelstadt,
and Floridi (2017).
36Sternberg and Davidson (1995), Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987), and Carter (2017).
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bypass cognitive and conative faculties. In Case 4, though, it does. Call this, accord-
ingly, a Type 4 case: a case of eradication manipulation that qualifies as such, with
reference to TMS, via ‘blocking’ rather than via ‘shedding’.
7. Extended thoughmanipulation of Types 1-437 hardly exhaust possible categories.
In fact, we can imagine subcategories of several of these, whichmap on to, e.g., partial
or total bypassing, partial or total shedding, partial or total blocking, etc.
The aim of the above taxonomy is to reveal a few of the salient contrast points
when it comes to violations of a plausible freedom against thought manipulation—
viz., one that is framed (as TMS is) in terms of a freedom against (at least) the caused
acquisition of non-autonomous attitudes and against the non-autonomous eradication
of (would-be) autonomous attitudes.
Aswe continue to develop new technologies thatmake thoughtmanipulation pos-
sible in new ways—including (and in addition to BCIs) various kinds of brain ‘im-
plants’38 along with potential new breakthroughs in research on artificial neurons39
and deep brain stimulation40—it becomes more important to anticipate and under-
stand varieties of thought manipulation that such technologies enable. The above is
an attempt at engaging in this kind of anticipation.
Further work in (extended) thought manipulation will go beyond the kind of suf-
ficient condition (TMS) advanced here in order to make progress vis-à-vis the articu-
lation of conditions necessary as well as sufficient for extended thought manipulation,
a project more ambitious than what I’ve set out to do here.41
37I’ve intentionally illustrated the varieties of thought manipulation I have by using BCIs. This is
because BCIs—even if less practically applicable today than smartphones, through which thought ma-
nipulation is also in principle possible—allow us to frame these kinds of manipulation in an particularly
sharp way. It is worth noting though that BCIs aren’t necessary for thoughtmanipulation. If the extended
mind and cognition theses (see §§2-3) hold water, and one’s mind supervenes partly on a thinker’s ex-
tracranial environment, the ingredients are present to manipulate ‘extended’ thought. See Carter and
Palermos (2016) for discussion on this point.
38For discussion of research on the implantation of ‘false memories’, see, e.g., Ramirez et al. (2013).
See also Carter (2020b Ch. 1).
39See, e.g., Simon et al. (2015).
40See, e.g., Suthana and Fried (2014) and Flöel et al. (2008).
41Thanks toMarcBlitz, ChristophBublitz, JohnTillson, andRuaridhGilmartin for helpful comments
on a draft of this paper.
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